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Abstract 
Government departments have limited resources but they are responsible for the healthy 
functioning of whole markets. This tension is amplified by the opportunities to generate, 
share and use information from new data sources and digital technologies. Huge increases in 
volumes and types of data produced by sensors and firms’ IT systems can potentially be 
shared between firms which can cause information overload. This paper uses government 
orchestration theory to investigate the problems and opportunities of the UK’s maritime 
transport ministry as it supports resilience planning for the whole country’s ports system. We 
build on the developing Lean Government (l- Government) literature by theorizing on the 
differences between government and other stakeholders. We use a case study to investigate 
how these differences hinder as well as support the role of a government department. And 
how the special perspective of an orchestrator can integrate and filter information, motivate 
diverse collaborators and support the use of orchestration platforms in l-Government. 
Keywords: Lean Government, government orchestration, port resilience, integration 
perspective capability sharing, data sharing  
1. Introduction 
In this paper we study the government’s role in resilience planning for the whole UK ports 
system using the lenses of lean government (l-Government) theory and network orchestration 
theory. Resilience is the capability of a system to return to or “bounce back” to a normal state 
after a disturbance or crisis. This capability includes a return to a different stable state that is 
potentially an improvement on the previous system (Aldunce et al., 2014; Manyena et al., 
2011). Resilience planning involves port stakeholders working together to prepare port 
systems to be more resilient. The UK is an island nation so its sea ports are critical interfaces 
for most of its international goods trade (Shaw et al., 2017).    
We use a case study of a division within the UK’s Department for Transport (DfT), to 
investigate how it influences a country-wide system of organisations and government 
departments. We focus on the Maritime Resilience Planning team (MRPt) within the DfT’s 
Maritime Security and Resilience Division’s (MSRD). And we focus on its orchestration role 
rather than its policy-making or its regulatory role. The MRPt has limited resources on one 
hand. And one the other hand it is faced with complex challenges from new digital 
technologies, from the responsibility for the health of a mixture of public and private markets 
and from many unforcastable hazards to the resilience of the UK ports system. In order to 
cope, it has resorted to orchestration practices where it acts indirectly through the work of 
other stakeholders. We use orchestration theory to make sense of how the MRPt manages this 
tension and we use l-government theory in turn to understand how a small department can 
better orchestrate resilience planning for a whole country’s ports system (Janssen & Estevez, 
2013; Janssen & Helbig, 2015). 
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Past research has used the capability flow path concept to understand how information could 
be shared more easily between ports systems stakeholders (Shaw et al., 2017). Information 
such as what port capabilities are functional or which are available to share. Many factors 
determine how information is shared between government and other stakeholders (Praditya et 
al., 2017).We seek to understand how to help the DfT to motivate ports stakeholders; 
coordinate their capabilities to prepare for unforecastable crises; and better use the vast range 
of sensors, business IT systems and other information resources that are available within the 
UK transport industry. This includes data which is increasingly collected by public-private 
information platforms and international trade platforms (Klievink et al., 2016; Bharosa et al. 
2013). Our research question is how and why can ports system stakeholders be helped and 
motivated to work together more smoothly by sharing information and capabilities in 
resilience planning? Why they would cooperate and how would they do it? The governance 
of these activities and the architectural mechanisms which facilitate many stakeholders 
working together are common themes in the literature and we reflect this in our focus on 
platforms and studying the approach to orchestration (Praditya et al, 2017; Klievink et al., 
2016; Brown et al., 2017). 
First we describe the theoretical background of network orchestration in the context of the l-
Government and related literatures and then we introduce the resilience planning literature. 
Next we explain our research process based on long term access to a government department 
and other industry stakeholders. Then we use a rich and diverse set of examples from our 
research to show how capability sharing is orchestrated by government. And how it could be 
improved. We conceptualise the special perspective of government as something which 
brings benefits as well as challenges when faced with using the new digital resources of a 
whole market. Finally, we use our theoretical ideas to suggest how to orchestrate the finding 
of alternative capabilities in the UK ports system; how stakeholders can be motivated to share 
them; and how this might benefit researchers and managers working in this area. 
2. Theoretical background 
2.1 Orchestrating networks using platforms in a Lean Government approach 
Orchestrators are organisations which have a system-level role that is qualitatively different 
from the roles of the other organisations in the system. Different aspects of network 
orchestration include enacting and developing government policy (Janssen & Estevez, 2013; 
Janssen & Helbig, 2015); setting the vision and focusing members (Moller et al. 2005); 
mobilizing resources, delegation, dividing up roles, facilitation and integration (Goerzen, 
2005; Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999; Shaw, 2007); knowledge transfers among network 
members and network-level learning (Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999); coordination, 
configuration and reconfiguration of the network to adapt to change (Hinterhuber 2002; 
Goerzen, 2005; Shaw, 2007); and value creation (Moller & Svahn, 2006; Dhanaraj & Parkhe 
2006). Fundamentally, an orchestrator does not own other network members (Dhanaraj & 
Parkhe, 2006; van Heck & Vervest, 2007; Moller et al., 2005; Moller & Svahn, 2006). 
Lean Government (l-Government) concepts refine the wider orchestration literature in the 
context of mixed of public and private agencies and in terms of how and why orchestration is 
done. The l-Government approach orchestrates stakeholders to use their combined 
capabilities to mutually help each other to do more with less resources using public-private 
platforms (Janssen & Estevez, 2013; Klievink at., 2016). l-Government is an appropriate 
theoretical lens because UK ports are extremely specialised, they lack internal redundancy 
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and crises are unforecastable. So a means of mutually sharing capabilities presents a possible 
way for a directorate with few resources to help a whole national market. This is important 
because the UK imports 50% of its food and 91% of this comes by sea. For a full description 
of the role of ports and the resilience and information sharing issues that ports firms and 
government are faced with please see Shaw et al. (2017).  
Orchestrating in this sense means that government directs and influences and is not directly 
involved in the production activities of ports. This means decoupling “steering” activities like 
policy-making and regulation from “rowing” activities such as service-delivery and 
compliance checking (Osborne & Gaebler, 1993). Decoupling is enabled by using platforms 
to integrate stakeholders and to share their capabilities and resources, which include 
information. An orchestrator builds the network that it influences, even if is a subset of an 
already functioning system. It picks appropriate participants, motivates them to join, 
influences them and then checks that their behaviour fulfils their role. It also facilitates the 
building of environments in which this can happen.  
These environments are commonly digital platforms which help stakeholders to find other 
stakeholders who can help them. This is because in orchestrated networks it is other 
participants which provide nearly all the capabilities, not the orchestrator. The link between a 
network orchestrator and the network platform is that the orchestrator builds or at least 
governs the platform in a way which supports its orchestration aims. Platforms are the means 
of organisation and the means of orchestration. Platforms link stakeholders so that they can 
share each other’s capabilities and resources in various ways, which are mutually beneficial 
and which create  higher level products or services (de Reuver1et al., 2017; Janssen & van 
der Voort, 2016; Iyer & Davenport, 2008; Iansiti & Levien, 2004). Platforms support new 
ways of value creation and collaboration. They use some form of information infrastructure 
to organize a network of stakeholders and they create new business models.  
Platforms can be non-digital or digital. They can be one, two or multisided with each ‘side’ 
being a category of stakeholder. Platforms facilitate the sharing of information and other 
capabilities based on that information (Klievink at., 2016; Brown et al., 2017, Bharosa et al. 
2013). Brown et al. group the research on inter-organisational platforms into three 
dimensions (2017). The first is how a platform’s organisational form is collectively visualised 
to support use and innovation. The second is a dynamic view of how market forces drive 
change within the makeup of stakeholders, their product and service innovations and how 
they use the platform. The third is a ‘snap shot’ view of how the architectural structure of the 
platform enables firms to link business processes together in a modular manner. These three 
dimensions constitute a typology of platform strategies which can be used to collectively 
characterise a platform. l-Government is concerned with many-sided platforms which 
governments use as “regulated environments” to manage the other stakeholders (Janssen & 
Estevez, 2013).     
Recent orchestration research has focused on mixed public and private sector networks. The 
platform and orchestration aspects of l-Government are fast developing areas of research. But 
more research is needed into how orchestration platforms are designed, governed and 
operated. And how public and private organisations can be motivated to use platforms and to 
participate in orchestrated activities in order to create mutual benefits (Janssen & Helbig, 
2015, Janssen & Estevez, 2013). In this study we investigate how an orchestrator can 
aggregate, quality check and use the vast amounts of data which can now be collected 
through new forms of digital connections and communications (Janssen & Helbig, 2015). 
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2.2 The complex nature of ports resilience planning  
Resilience planning is a major part of government because the first priority of a government 
is to ensure the functioning of society. Port resilience is a subset of the disaster resilience 
literature which deals with the operation of ports (Achuthan et al., 2015). In the UK port 
resilience work runs in parallel to work on safeguarding all other Critical National 
Infrastructure. Port resilience researchers have studied the roles of different port stakeholders 
(Becker and Caldwell, 2015; Shaw et al., 2017); stakeholder interdependency and co-
opetition (Hsieh et al., 2014); finding alternative ports to use (Akakura et al., 2015); port 
bottlenecks (Trepte & Rice, 2014); and port network capacity simulations (Paul & Maloni, 
2010). But there has been little research into how the many ports stakeholders can be 
orchestrated by a single organisation to improve resilience planning. Maritime ports are 
complex operational systems with many different types of stakeholders, for example shipping 
lines, terminal operators, harbour masters, storage firms, cargo processors, passengers, local 
residents, transport firms and logistics service providers (Becker & Caldwell, 2015). Their 
interests are seldom aligned and there is an urgent need for the UK ports sector to improve its 
resilience planning (Davies, 2014, Achuthan et al., 2015). 
Information sharing opportunities and barriers are a major aspect of the complexity of ports. 
Port stakeholders depend on each other’s capabilities to provide services, people, cargo and 
information. The flow of goods to, through and beyond a port has been conceptualised by the 
capability flow path. This is the serially linked set of capabilities which enable the purpose of 
a port (Shaw et al., 2017). A port system’s highly interlinked capabilities mean that when a 
crisis removes one capability it will have a cascading effect on other capabilities (Hsieh et al., 
2014). The close interlinking also means that port stakeholders might sometimes help each 
other by sharing spares, work-arounds and other alternative capabilities (Akakura et al., 
2015). However, this requires that the complexity generated by such interdependence must be 
managed by sharing information in some way (Comfort et al., 2001; Welsh, 2014).  
Sharing information helps to promote sharing capabilities but there are complex barriers to 
sharing assets and customers. Many specialised equipment cannot be moved e.g. container 
cranes. Some equipment requires trained operators or perhaps the equipment cannot be 
moved in time. Sometimes are the barriers are commercial. For example, if customers are 
forced to seek new ports then they will not return once shared equipment are returned. One a 
whole port level, some owners of multiple ports would first try to replace the loss of a UK 
port by using their European ports. Even sharing data raises the concern that Government and 
competitors might use the information to oppose planning applications for site development. 
We have summarised the interrelations between the concepts of network orchestration, l-
government and platforms together with the complexity problems generated by ports 
resilience planning in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Initial conceptual framework.  
3. Method   
3.1 Sample and context 
Our objective was to understand how government can support better resilience planning. We 
used a qualitative approach as we were interested in subjective questions of “how” and “why” 
rather than of “how many”. We focused on the subjective needs of different stakeholders for 
information about alternative capabilities which could substitute for capabilities damaged in a 
crisis. These are the main ingredients of a resilience plan. We followed Yin’s case study 
approach to answer questions of “how” and “why” (2003). Case studies are useful for 
investigating contemporary phenomena, which researchers have no control over (Eisenhardt, 
1989). They are also a valid approach for information systems research (Benbasat et al, 1987; 
Lee, 1989). A case study approach fitted well with our investigation of the information flows 
between the government and ports firms. We were concerned with complex dynamic 
phenomena so we used several different data collection methods and many different data 
sources (ibid). In our investigation we followed Yin’s advice on embedded case studies 
because our research question was about a single system of national ports (2003). But we 
were interested in the interrelations of phenomena on different levels of analysis rather than 
just the global nature of the system. We chose case sub-units which gave us opportunities for 
analysing the resilience planning interactions between stakeholders, whilst anchoring us in 
the context of the overall case. 
3.2 Data  
• A ports system is highly fragmented
• Information overload: too many 
stakeholders in UK ports, too many 
IT & new data sources to access
• Unforcastable crises
• How to prioritise? Who is included?
• Limited government & private 
resources
• Is “bouncing back” after a crisis
• Resilience planning = information & 
capability sharing
• Which requires awareness of 
information & capabilities to share
Resilience
Complexity problems
Facilitation & orchestration:  (“option management”) 
Block arrows show the order and the arrangement of the initial 
framework’s conceptual flow, as follows:
1. Network orchestrators include l-government forms which are responsible 
for the resilience of critical national systems like ports
2. Network orchestration relies on platforms to join stakeholders and to 
enable network governance.
3. Ports resilience and any network of joined up stakeholders produces 
complexity problems because platforms join some aspects of network 
members . Joining-up creates dependencies, multiplications of potential 
outcomes, i.e complexity. 
4. In ports resilience planning complexity problems include information 
overload from new digital data, unforcastable crises, bounding the system 
of stakeholders and prioritisation of resource uses. These problems are 
amplified by limited government resources with which to deal with them. 
L-government
• L-government orchestrates a mix of 
public & private agencies
• Lean: Combining diverse 
capabilities to “do more with less”
Platform
• Links members (stakeholders) at scale
• Links diverse types of members (“multisided”)
• Efficiency value: generates economies of scale 
by increasing capability utilisation & synergy 
(sharing information and capabilities)
• New value: mutual co-creation of value from 
new combinations of abilities
• The means of network organisation and of 
network governance
Network Orchestrators
• Single organisations, members overlap several 
networks
• Qualitatively different role to network members, 
acts on network level not member level
• Organises members to co-create mutual value
• Has a network-level role - “steering not rowing”
Network governance
• Includes setting goals, recruiting, 
managing members and maybe 
platform building
Orchestrator is 
responsible for 
network 
governance
Manging the platform
enables managing 
members
A sophisticated 
and complex 
form of 
orchestration is 
L-government
Government has 
ultimate 
responsibility for 
system 
resilience
Awareness is reduced 
by complexity 
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We collected data from January 2010 to May 2018. During this period we held semi-
structured interviews, workshops and meetings with the managers and staff of the 
Department for Transport (DfT), port landlords and other port system organisations. We 
selected the interview participants and their firms so that they covered a range of UK ports as 
well as a range of different types of port stakeholders. This included ship operators, harbour 
masters port, landlords, logistics firms and government departments. The interviews lasted 
between 30 minutes and 2 hours. See Table I for examples. We validated our emerging 
findings at meetings with participants to listen to their feedback, and we frequently published 
validation documents to test our ideas and gain comments. Also, one of the authors was 
seconded from his university to the DfT for 2 years during this period to advise on simulating 
crises in ports and another author was sponsored by the DfT in a PhD research project from 
2015 to 2019. This extended research access provided multiple opportunities for unstructured 
exploration of different aspects of the case. We used it to test our emerging 
conceptualisations of the case phenomena on multiple occasions and with a range of different 
participants. Our frequent, varied and longitudinal contact gave us valuable feedback on how 
well our ideas fitted with participants’ interpretations of how relevant our ideas were. And it 
also helped to increase trust and the levels of disclosure.  
Stakeholder 
type Stakeholder(s)  
Type of 
meeting 
Government 
department  
(NB: The DfT, 
the MSRD and 
the MRPt are not 
always the lead 
actor in 
activities) 
Cabinet Office Interviews 
Defra - two workshops and an interview Workshop 
DfT - multiple interviews, meetings and 
informal communications 
Interview 
DfT- Big Data workshop with Resilience 
Head and data analysts 
Workshop 
 
Meeting with DfT and DECC Workshop 
UK Transport Minister, Stephen Hammond  Presentation 
Customs World Customers Union meeting Presentation 
Satellite data 
sources Satellite data providers  
Workshop 
Ferry operator DFDS - Immingham Interview 
Industry 
Association 
British Harbour Masters Association Conference 
Int. Assoc.of Maritime Economists Presentation 
UK Major Ports Group - three meetings Interview 
UK Major Port Group, British Ports 
Association and UK Chamber of Shipping 
Workshop 
Mixed 
stakeholder 
group 
DfT hosted workshop with UK port sector Workshop 
Montgomery Exercise Workshop 
South East Ports Group (twice) Workshop 
Tidal surge workshop  Workshop 
UK Ports and DfT Workshop 
Shaw DR, Achuthan K, Sharma A and Grainger A (2019) Resilience Orchestration and Resilience Facilitation: how 
government can orchestrate the whole UK ports market with limited resources - the case of UK ports resilience, Government 
Information Quarterly, (in press). 
  
 
 
 
Multi-stakeholder validation workshop 
hosted by the DfT 
Presentation 
Port operator 
Ports: Southampton, Dover, 
Grimsby, Harwich, Tilbury 
Interviews, workshops, 
meetings 
Immingham port 
Interviews, observations and user 
groups meetings (April/ May 2018) 
Port of London 
Authority  
Meetings, workshops and interviews (3 
February 2011 and 4 September 2013) 
Port stakeholders 
Oil supplier, estuary services, moorings 
firm, towing firm, container services, police 
Interviews 
Power station Drax (twice) Interview 
Table I: Summary of main meetings with stakeholders and their organisational types. 
We collected data from meeting notes and telephone conversations, meeting reports and 
informal conversations that were supplemented by the participants’ internal reports and their 
website content. We interviewed participants in their offices or the offices of other 
participants, for example we interviewed many staff and partners of a major ports operating 
group as part of their internal business continuity programme. All interviews and meetings 
were recorded using detailed paper notes because of the commercial and politically sensitive 
nature of some of the subjects of discussion. All notes were then discussed between at least 
two of the four authors to minimise researcher bias and to triangulate for emerging ideas.  
3.3 Data Analysis 
We chose a social science approach because port resilience planning intersects the different 
social systems that are focused on UK ports including public policy and administration, 
business, transport and law. We used a qualitative approach because the influencing 
mechanisms which might be used to motivate participants to share resources, capabilities or 
information were subjective. Also, we studied complex organisational processes as we 
wanted to show “what precedes what”, which was another reason to use a qualitative 
approach (Miles & Huberman, 1994). We used an interpretive approach that was based on 
hermeneutics. Hermeneutics is a major branch of interpretive philosophy and we used Klein 
and Myers’ hermeneutic principles for conducting and evaluating interpretive field research 
(1999). Hermeneutics is based on the idea that an understanding of a whole system comes 
from contrasting preconceptions and new understandings gained from studying a system’s 
parts and their different interrelationships. In hermeneutics the process of interpretation is 
cyclical. Researchers move from an initial understanding of the parts, to an understanding of 
the whole. Then from an understanding of the whole to contrasting it with the surrounding 
context of the whole and finally, back to a more developed understanding of the parts (ibid). 
This approach is particularly useful for analysing complex cases because the bounding of 
researchers’ information gathering and processing capabilities is mitigated by a repeating 
cycle of studying different relationships in a much wider system. Which is too complex to be 
considered at once. It also suited our long term research relationships.  
In our investigation we cycled between multiple levels including the level of all UK ports, the 
level of rivers with several ports, the whole port level of the port operator and the operational 
levels of individual port firms. This enabled us to perceive an interdependent whole (Klein & 
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Myers, 1999; Chalmers, 2004). We chose the case of the UK ports system as an extreme case 
because its multiple levels of government, of river or region holding several ports and of port 
landlord and port operations firms (Eisenhardt, 1989). The case was special because of our 
access to multiple levels and ‘rhythms’ of government, from the Minister to day-to-day 
operations (Janssen & van der Voort, 2016). This allowed us to perceive the multi-level 
contexts of how information flowed between stakeholders, which cases with other system 
boundaries would not provide (Siggelkow, 2007).  
Klein and Myers’ hermeneutic principles (1999) are as follows: 1. The Hermeneutic Circle – 
interpret sensory data by cycling between the parts and the whole of a system. Data, 
organisations and material objects, plus researchers and participants are counted as parts. 2. 
Contextualization – consider the social and historical “back story” of the case. How and why 
was the case data produced by the case phenomena? 3. Interaction between Researchers and 
Subjects – how is the case data socially constructed by participants interacting with them? 
Consider and question research assumptions. 4. Abstraction and Generalization – identify 
links between the idiographic level of the case and the wider literature. Test theoretical 
contributions and link to external literatures. 5. Dialogical Reasoning – explain researchers’ 
initial biases and preconceptions. Describe how and why the initial conceptual lens of the 
investigation changed. How did different concepts promote an understanding, or 
misunderstanding, of the case situation?  6. Multiple Interpretations – did researchers and 
participants have different perspectives on the same situation and make different 
interpretations? 7. Suspicion – look for socially created distortions of participants’ accounts 
of the case situation. Not as truths or falsehoods but due to commercial or political 
sensitivities systematically influencing actors’ the words. Finally, researchers must consider 
how these principles interrelate within their research process. This is a processual, multi-
perspective and iterative approach that is particularly appropriate for a study of how to 
orchestrate multiple participants working together in new ways. 
4. Case analysis  
In the UK the Department for Transport (DfT) is tasked with supporting the country’s 
transport network. The roads, railways, aviation and maritime transport infrastructure such as 
ports (DfT, 2018a). Our focus was on the Maritime Resilience Planning Team (MRPt), which 
was part of the Maritime Security and Resilience Division (MSRD). Which was part of the 
Maritime Directorate. In turn this was part of the International, Security and Environment 
Group, one of six groups that made up the DfT (DfT, 2015a, DfT, 2018b). The MSRD’s 
general objectives was to maintain and develop the security and resilience of maritime 
transport for UK ports and UK flagged ships around the world (DfT, 2015b). The DfT is a 
large government ministry and during our research there were between four and five staff in 
the MRPt. In this study we focused on how the MRPt helped port stakeholders to work 
together to make port systems more resilient.  
Each port has many stakeholders and the UK ports system has many levels of organisation. 
On the port level, stakeholders include shipping firms, harbour masters, terminal operators, 
warehouse operators, logistics service providers, haulage firms and many other port users.  
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Figure 2: The multiple levels of the ports system of government and other organisations, 
and the platforms that span them. (A) The ports system has levels above a single port 
which depend on one’s perspective, which include but not be limited to spatial, 
political/organisational/ legal and commercial levels. “Levels” here means intersystem 
gaps which need bridging. (B) EXISTING Government and private organisational 
structures bridge some gaps. (C) Government bridges other gaps with ADDED 
organisations. E.g. by setting up networks and forums, running workshops. Each 
stakeholder organisation has their own IT systems, information and capabilities. 
Port level
Stakeholder level
Business process 
level
Specific capability  
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Levels in a single port
Single place for all 
activities below. Run by 
port owner.
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The MRPt encouraged each port to produce a resilience plan for the whole port to explain 
what would be done if certain crises occurred (Shaw et al., 2017). On a higher level, the 
MRPt connected ports stakeholders with stakeholders from outside the port boundary. For 
example, Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) covered the same areas as regional police forces. 
They were usually led by local authorities and consisted of representatives from blue light 
responders and other stakeholders as needed. They also included organisations that were 
based outside of ports such as local public services, emergency services, local authorities, the 
NHS, the Environment Agency, the Highways Agency, utility companies and others (GOV, 
2018). On a yet higher level of the UK ports system there were other stakeholder networks. 
For example, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) led the East 
Coast Flood Group which included coastal Local Resilience Forums (LRFs), the 
Environment Agency, the Meteorological (Met) Office, utility firms, the Emergency Planning 
Society, voluntary sector organisations, the UK’s Central Government Group for coastal 
flooding and other UK government departments (Powell, 2015). The East Coast Flood Group 
acted as a two-way connection between policy-making processes of the DfT, other 
government departments and the UK’s East Coast ports. It focused on tidal surges and other 
coastal flooding risks. Port Resilience Forums were created as sub-forums by the MRPt to 
connect to the LRFs. The MRPt also organised multi-stakeholder workshops in each port or 
port region to either highlight important risks or to bridge gaps between stakeholders where 
there were none before. There were also trade associations like the UK Major Ports Group 
and the British Ports Association. 
We have summarised the multiple levels of the UK ports system and the platforms that span 
them in Figure 2. In Figure 2 the “level” boundaries are obvious gaps between the subsystems 
of the whole ports system. “Intersystem gaps” are where subsystems of the whole ports 
system are not already linked by some medium of connection, e.g. ownership or common 
control. We viewed these gaps in terms of spatial, political/ organisational/ legal and 
commercial issues because these are important contexts for the resilience of this system. 
Other lenses could be used to view the same system and they would suggest other level 
architectures. Here we have only included those which are concerned with resilience 
planning. The gaps make the structure of the ports sub-system boundaries easy to perceive. 
But these same gaps must be bridged by different platforms in order to plan for ports 
resilience across the whole system. 
4.1 The complexities of defining the role of the MRPt. 
The general objectives of the MSRD relating to security were clear but its precise role in 
resilience planning was very difficult to communicate to our researchers. The general 
objectives were to safeguard the UK’s maritime transport systems. These included an “all 
encompassing” list of areas such as inspections, counter piracy, international engagement, 
stakeholder engagement, medical hazards, advice and guidance and resilience (DfT, 2016) 
But how it should do this was not defined in any document focused in resilience planning that 
we could find. In interviews with MRPt we found that this vagueness was due to a number of 
factors including the unforcastability of crises, a lack of regulatory power over port 
stakeholders and the complexity of the network of stakeholders that operated and used UK 
ports. The mission of the overall DfT was clear (DfT, 2018a). At the level of the MRPt we 
found that the operational definition of the role was broad. For example, the welcome booklet 
that new staff received said that the MRPt’s role was to protect ports against risks which 
included extreme weather (DfT, 2016). In the Maritime Director Information Pack the 
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MSRD’s Interim Deputy Director said that the MSRD’s aim was to protect maritime 
transport. Which covered UK ports and UK and Red Ensign flagged ships wherever they 
were all round the world (Rowan, 2015). And during our research with the MRPt their 
emphasis was on physical port infrastructure and port operations. This included what they 
called a cycle of “Readiness, Response, Recovery and Resumption” (GFG, 2016). 
A more precise definition of the scope of the MRPt’s role was important because every action 
they made was in the public view and afterwards it was closely scrutinised by the media and 
by politicians. The MRPt was a small number of people with limited resources. So defining 
the scope of its role was also critical for prioritising the use of those resources. But defining 
exactly where they should intervene was very difficult because every risk was different, and 
then every actual incident was different, and all parts of the transport system were linked to 
each other. So it was difficult to say where the role of the MRPt stopped. They frequently 
asked themselves “Where does the list of stakeholders that we need to support end?” For 
example, should they have included dry-side as well as wet-side port operators when 
organising meetings or email lists? Should they have included shipping firms as well as port-
based firms? Should the scope of their responsibility have stopped at the port’s loading and 
unloading terminals or should it have included the roads that haulage firms used to get to and 
from a port? 
The resilience part of MSRD's role has always been rooted in the UK’s Civil Contingencies 
Act 2004 which describes the responsibilities of Harbour Authorities in crisis planning 
(MCA, 2016). More recently security risks had come to the fore, which were handled by the 
security teams within MSRD. The dynamic nature of both resilience risks and changes in the 
political environment such as Brexit, meant that the MRPt’s role was fluid.  
4.2 The complexities of working with ports system stakeholders to increase resilience  
The UK ports system consisted of all the ports around the coastline of the UK and those 
accessible by major waterways, the many firms and individuals that worked in and used each 
port and the UK government departments with responsibilities that would be affected by a 
loss in the capabilities that the ports provided. From interviews with the MRPt we identified 
17 areas of stakeholders. Each stakeholder area had different roles and concerns and each UK 
port had a different mix of stakeholder types according to the port’s cargo specialisation (see 
Table 2). However, the stakeholders that the staff had to deal with included many more than 
this depending on which aspects of the UK maritime transport system they were concerned 
with at the time. 
Stakeholder area of 
work 
Role Examples of concerns 
Port/terminal operator Loading/unloading, storage, 
throughput, stevedores, crane 
operators, mooring/berthing, 
piloting, sorting, packaging, 
dredging, contracts and fees 
Capacity and labour planning, 
forecasting ship movements 
and cargo types, cargo state of 
readiness for unloading (e.g. 
frozen). 
Tenants Processing, manufacture, repairs, 
provisions, bunkering and storage. 
Facilitating raw material 
arrival,  vehicle repacking and 
finished product output  
Workforce Sorting, loading/ unloading, 
storage, modal transfer 
Detailed instructions of where, 
when and what to do 
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Ship operators Cargo pick-up, transport by water 
and delivery 
Where to dock and how long 
for, refuelling, customs  
Inland freight hauliers Cargo pick-up and drop off, 
within-port transfers 
Locations, driver hospitality, 
timing, cargo details, parking  
Coastguard Safety and rescue Responsibility scope and risks 
Utilities and Statutory 
undertakers 
Provision of power, 
communications, water 
Demand and user needs, port 
expansion, new electric ships 
Emergency responders First at the scene of event Responsibility scope and risks 
Inland transport Network Rail (rail infrastructure), 
freight operating companies, 
Highways England (highway 
infrastructure), Local Highways 
Authorities, freight trains 
Responsibility scope and 
service levels, safety 
(especially passengers), port 
expansion plans and use 
pattern changes 
Nearby stakeholders Marinas, leisure craft, local 
transport, communities, natural 
habitats, sea life and birds 
Boundaries, permissions, 
contact numbers, 
environmental testing   
Port authorities Safety, environmental issues, port 
security, port police, navigation, 
local vessel traffic management 
Port stakeholders’ business 
details, environmental testing, 
integration of stakeholders 
Freight brokers, carriers, 
shippers 
Supply chain operations, 
inventory control, cargo 
manifesting, insurance, financing, 
legal services 
Supply chain management 
data, financial and other 
business information  
Specialist marine 
engineers 
Site-specific analysis and works Asset purpose and history 
information  
Local and Central 
Government 
National resilience planning, 
monitor safety and security 
regulations, free up finance in 
times of stress, apply hazmat 
incident rules and regulations. 
Includes: Defra, the Environment 
Agency, the Marine Accident 
Investigation Branch, HM 
Revenue and Customs, UK Border 
Agency, Port Health Authority 
Inspectors, the Health and Safety 
Executive, Local Enterprise 
Partnerships 
Port resilience preparation 
information: contact details, 
information sources, scope of 
authority information, 
pathways for decision 
escalation, awareness and 
broadcasting mechanisms, 
scenario planning, simulation 
models and joint exercises, 
port development plans 
Unions Supporting members  Working conditions and hours 
Local Resilience 
Forums (LRFs) 
Pre-planning and development of 
incident management protocols 
and training exercises, stakeholder 
inter-agency coordination and 
communications 
Raw material information: 
contact information, scope of 
responsibility, capacity 
information  
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Trade associations, e.g. 
the British Ports 
Association, UK Major 
Ports Group 
Supporting members, gathering 
and sharing information, 
identification and advocacy of 
members’ issues 
Information on industry-level 
issues and international issues, 
sharing best practice, lobbying 
(eg better freight rail links) 
Table 2: Port system stakeholders have different roles which generate different 
concerns and different needs for information and other capabilities. 
The huge number of stakeholders produced complexities for the MRPt in three different 
ways. It was difficult to understand who all the ports system stakeholders were, what 
capabilities they had and how to motivate them to share these capabilities. First, exactly who 
all the stakeholders were was not clear to the MRPt or anyone else. Inside each port there 
were a large number of business that operated different parts of the port and each port was 
very different. Inside a port the MRPt could ask the port operator for a complete list of firms. 
But we found that port operators did not know who even nearby stakeholders were outside 
the port. In our study one port operator mentioned that they did not even know who owned 
the buildings next door to where the interview was being held, which was just outside the 
port boundary. So it was difficult for them to say who should or should not be involved in 
resilience activities. A major problem with trying to describe a whole country’s port system 
was that the number of stakeholders was large and unknown, and changed depending on the 
reason for asking. For example, a flood defence project for the river Humber included 
stakeholders from multiple ports, local government and all other stakeholders operating on 
the same large river (ABP, 2017; Watson, 2017).  
Second, the MRPt found it difficult to gather, maintain and use information on what 
capabilities each of the stakeholders possessed. For example, Deep Port was a GIS database 
of UK port-related infrastructure for decision-making during crises. However, it proved very 
difficult to keep that system up to date. Knowledge about capabilities was critical for resilient 
planning because it was the overall capability of the port to import and export goods that the 
MRPt tried to make resilient. This overall capability was made up of a capability flow path, 
the interlinked serial capabilities of stakeholders on the flow path of a cargo which passed 
through a port (Shaw et al., 2017). Even if a particular stakeholder was known to the MRPt, 
information on what that stakeholder did or could do to help in a crisis was not easily 
available. This was important because a key role of resilience planning was to plan 
alternatives, work-arounds and new options. These included alternative transport routes. For 
example, 20,000 tonnes of wood pellets are delivered to Drax power station every day from 
the port of Immingham on the UK’s East Coast (Drax, 2018). Even if the rail route between 
Immingham and Drax was blocked by some crisis there were three other alternative routes 
and ports available to use (Backhouse, 2017; Drax, 2015). 
Another type of alternative capability that we were told about in our interviews was 
alternative sources of consumables. For example, in the petrol dispute of September 2000 
ports depended heavily on the MRPt’s capability to influence organisations outside the port 
(BBC, 2000). The pilots who helped ships to safely sail into UK ports needed petrol for the 
long drives out to the pilot stations, from which they would then sail out to meet the incoming 
ships. The MRPt had to persuade the emergency services to let pilots refill their cars with 
petrol from emergency ambulance depots (Davies, 2015). Some alternative capabilities were 
owned by the same firms that might have been impacted by a crisis. For example, very large 
firms like Associated British Ports (ABP) operated several UK ports so if a road blockage 
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shut down traffic to one port then ABP could have potentially used the capabilities of another 
port that it operated. In that situation the firm itself might have recognised the need to use the 
alternative capability. But when a capability was owned by one firm but needed to be shared 
with another firm the MRPt might have had to use its influence to ensure this happened. But 
that required knowledge of this alternative capability’s existence in the first place. Efficiency 
pressures have forced even large firms in the ports industry to have very few redundant or 
alternative capabilities. These pressures forced significant specialisations on all stakeholders. 
So knowing the exact specifications of potential alternative and sharable capabilities was 
critical for the MRPt but very difficult to get.   
Third, the MRPt found it difficult to motivate stakeholders to share their capabilities. This 
was important because the MRPt did not use its own capabilities to provide any of the 
services that made up the overall function of a port. It relied on ports stakeholders to operate 
ports and to share the capabilities that other stakeholders might need in a crisis. It also relied 
on those same stakeholders to share information on the characteristics of the capabilities. 
Characteristics which included specialisations, capacities and other qualities that would be 
needed in order to substitute for them if they were removed by a crisis. But port firms did not 
like to do this because this information was commercially valuable to competitors. So the 
MRPt found it hard to persuade port firms to share operational capabilities with it, or even to 
share information on what these capabilities were. Forums, workshops and regulations such 
as the ISPS code were in operation but there were few incentives for firms within and outside 
ports to participate in the post-workshop activities which were coordinated by the MRPt. 
4.3 The complexities of using data from new data sources and firms’ information systems  
In our study the MRPt’s overall attitude was proactive because they sought to get 
stakeholders to plan ahead for resilience (Shaw et al., 2017). But they did plan extensively 
and interact with many stakeholders. Although they did wish to be more proactive, for 
example, to interrogate parts of the ports system to confirm that key capabilities were still 
functioning using new digital sensors and technologies. For example, a camera could show 
that a motorway was free from snow. One firm used GPS data from security guards’ 
handheld radios to check the status of their patrols in real-time and RFID chips on containers 
used location data to prove a journey’s progress. 
There was a bewildering range of new data sources that the MRPt could potentially harness 
either directly or via port firms’ information systems. This information could help resilience 
planning by warning of crises or by describing the available alternative capabilities. For 
example, the UK National Tide Gauge Network provides real-time data on tidal elevations at 
44 locations around the UK coast (NTSLF, 2018). These sensors warn of tidal surges which 
could flood ports. Individual ports maintain their own tide gauges as well (ABP, 2018). Also, 
the UK’s Met Office collects hourly measurements of temperature, wind direction and speed, 
humidity, visibility, pressure and other observations for approximately 140 locations across 
the UK (Met Office, 2018). Much additional information was captured by the business 
information systems used by ports stakeholders themselves not just the sensor networks that 
they maintained. One example of how the information systems of stakeholder organisations 
already monitored the health of ports’ business capabilities was each port’s Automatic 
Identification System (AIS) system. AIS used radar to find the real-time identifications, 
positions, courses, and speeds of all nearby ships.  
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The business information systems of port operators and the firms that worked in and through 
ports all could have potentially signalled a loss of capability or an event that would lead to 
one because controlling different capabilities was their purpose. Even outside ports the traffic 
flow and average speeds on limited parts of the UK’s road motorway network was monitored 
by the UK’s Motorway Incident Detection and Automatic Signalling system (MIDAS) 
(Summersgill et al., 2005). Different sensors, including MIDAS sensors, were used to 
estimate journey times and vehicle speeds. And this data was easily accessible on the Web 
using a Google Maps interface (Highways England, 2018). MIDAS integrates data from 
sensors such as Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) cameras, in-vehicle Global 
Positioning Systems (GPS) and induction loops built into the roads themselves (Highways 
England, 2016) for 50% of English roads (Highways England, 2012). In addition to the 
complexity of many data sources, the types of data available from these sources was also 
complex. Different sensors gather different information which varied in terms of what the 
sensors were designed to sense. Cameras, GPS locators and induction loops all collect 
different data and this changes the granularity and information content of what they provide. 
Also there were were open data feeds from Network Rail which ran the UK’s railway 
infrastructure (Network Rail, 2018) and there were other open government data sources 
(Gascó-Hernándeza et al., in press). 
All these information capabilities could have helped the MRPt and ports firms to warn of 
crises and to prepare for them by finding alternative capabilities. But the information 
overload problems that we saw at the stakeholder organisation level also existed here at the 
business information systems level, as well. The problems for the MRPt were awareness of 
which information sources might be useful, judging their quality and then knowing how to 
integrate and use the highly varied information that they contained.   
4.4 The differences between the MRPt and other ports system stakeholders 
The MRPt had three sets of capabilities that none of the other commercial stakeholders in the 
ports system had. It had a national focus rather than a focus on one or a few ports; it was 
concerned with anything that might affect the health of the ports system rather than other 
aspects of port activities, and it was part of the UK government rather than a type of 
commercial firm. The MRPt operated on the country level of the UK ports system rather than 
on the level of any single port or group of ports. This was a challenge when it came to 
knowing about the details of specific ports and their sub-systems. But it was an advantage 
when it came to accessing capabilities that were external to a particular port or to all ports. 
Port level stakeholders including the port authority itself knew little about events outside the 
port boundary. For example, a ferry operator that we interviewed had to ask a receptionist to 
monitor traffic reports on television, to watch out for traffic delays on the motorways which 
led to the port. The ferry operator did this to understand whether trucks would be late for their 
scheduled ferry crossings of the North Sea. 
Ports and their stakeholders also had the greatest difficulty in gaining use of capabilities 
owned by organisations outside the port. And the MRPt regularly helped them with this. For 
example, in winter 2007 the UK had a shortage of salt to treat the roads with, to keep them 
free of ice (BBC, 2010). So Felixstowe port asked the MRPt to persuade the local council to 
prioritise the port’s access roads for “gritting”. The MRPt also helped ports with other 
problems that were outside of their capability to influence. For example, in the Ash Cloud 
crisis of 2010 half a million UK citizens were stranded abroad when ash from the 
Eyjafjallajökull volcano prevented them from flying home (House of Lords, 2010). In an 
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effort to speed the transportation of people back to the UK the DfT used its derogation 
capability. It temporarily increased the capability of ferries to carry passengers by easing the 
legal restrictions on life boat places and on crew to passenger ratios. The MRPt also helped to 
secure capabilities from organisations that were very far outside the UK ports system. For 
example the MRPt funded academics to develop MARS, a port simulation tool to help 
stakeholders to discuss resilience decisions (MARS, 2018).  
The MRPt had a different context than commercial ports stakeholders because of its wider 
geographical scale; its wider criteria of interest in any and all port activities in the UK; its 
responsibility for maritime as well as land transport; and because it was a part of government. 
This special context seemed to be a useful capability in itself. Especially if it helped the 
MRPt to more easily know who all the ports system stakeholders were, to understand how to 
use stakeholders’ capabilities and to motivate stakeholders to share them. 
5.0 Discussion  
Our interviews and our other field data showed how the MRPt’s role of sensing and acting on 
the level of the whole ports system gave it a special context from which to view the UK ports 
system and with which to deal with the many stakeholders. This helped the MRPt to capture 
and to some extent integrate a large variety of information from diverse sources. So we call 
this concept an integration perspective for the whole ports system. The MRPt’s integration 
perspective generated complexity but it also enabled the MRPt to filter-out complexity for 
itself and for other stakeholders. Next we will explain the concept of integration perspective 
and how it sometimes enabled the MRPt to orchestrate resilience planning by removing 
barriers between other stakeholders. We call this removal of barriers to working together 
resilience facilitation after the concept of trade facilitation which removes “friction” in the 
trading process (WTO, 2018). 
5.1 The special capability of the MRPt is its integration perspective  
Our data showed that the MRPt had a much larger scale of awareness of the functioning of 
the ports system than other stakeholders. It had a wide interest in anything to do with the 
ports system’s health. Other stakeholders were too busy and too focused on specific aspects 
or subsystems. Responsibility for a whole system and the ability of a part of government to 
actively access information sources made the MRPt open to accepting information about the 
whole system. The MRPt’s integration perspective meant that its staff saw linkages between 
diverse information that other stakeholders did not see. For example, each port operator 
might hold information which described their own winter road salt storage levels. But only 
the staff of the MRPt saw how the readiness of each port related to the readiness of the UK as 
a whole or how one port might be in a position to help another. This special perspective is 
consistent with the “Rashomon effect”, the concept that individuals may perceive something 
differently because of their different system perspectives (Roth and Mehta, 2002). 
5.2 An integration perspective is a network orchestrator capability which can filter complexity  
The MRPt’s role had strong similarities to the concept of a network orchestrator in the                                                     
literature. Its integration perspective aggregated and presented the complex possibilities of 
the system and its environment on an ongoing basis. Its position gave it special access to 
information as well as a special ability to integrate this information, and use it in ways that 
other stakeholders could not. It is the very nature of orchestrators and government to be 
exposed to complexity and the orchestration literature describes different categories of 
complexity. For example, managing complex alliance networks (Goerzen, 2005); sharing 
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tacit knowledge between firms (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006); employing the competencies of 
other organisations (Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999; Janssen & Helbig, 2015); and coordinating 
between different network levels (Janssen & van der Voort, 2016, Shaw, 2007).  
In our study we saw that this integration perspective, in some cases, was also able to shield 
MRP staff and other stakeholders from the very complexity that their position afforded them. 
For example, MRP staff routinely prioritised large scale disruptions over smaller scale ones. 
They helped stakeholders by defining priorities for the whole UK ports system. The concept of 
integration perspective is similar to Jakob von Uexküll’s idea of an “umwelt” and the MRPt 
had a different umwelt to other ports stakeholders. An umwelt is a world view which includes 
access to special sensory data and special capabilities with which to act (Brentari, 2015). 
Special sensory data and special capabilities create a special context with which to analyse the 
sensory data and then decide how to act. A world view influences how one thinks and acts not 
just what one sees. The MRPt and the DfT sometimes used this context to filter complexities. 
For example, the 2014 Transport Resilience Review itself used a world view that was newly 
sensitised to extreme weather events on a country-wide scale and over an extended period. And 
it drew insights about the effects on national transport networks not just network components 
(Brown, 2014). Following the review’s recommendations the DfT has tried to spread awareness 
of the need for resilience planning to different port stakeholders who might not be aware of the 
“big picture” and the part they need to play within it.  
Our concept of integration perspective is consistent with the ambidextrous principle of 
adaptive governance because it incorporates the stability and accountability aspects of 
building and acknowledging “big picture” issues. But it also enables flexible decision-making 
by using the “big picture” to focus local resources (Wang et al., 2017; Janssen & van der 
Voort, 2016). The complexity of a system comes from the potential number of relationships 
that could potentially link stakeholders not from the number of stakeholders in the system. In 
our research this meant managing complex configurations of alternative capabilities provided 
by different stakeholders. The MRPt has the special ability to orchestrate information 
affordances (Leonardi, 2011). It can make stakeholders selectively aware of different 
“possibilities for use”. Alternatives include borrowing capabilities like spares, consumables 
or even terminal berths or warehouse space. This produces dynamics, uncertainties and 
unexpected behaviours, which are confusing because of the number or newness of options 
that potential relationships present. Generating, testing and choosing between alternative 
options takes time and cannot be done for all potential crises and all alternative options 
(Janssen & van der Voort, 2016). Fortunately the MRPt’s integration perspective sometimes 
allowed it and other stakeholders to avoid complexity by using the “big picture” to prioritise. 
The MRPt could access stakeholders’ goals in the context of the “big picture” to help them to 
filter out unrequired activities. But the MRPt did not do this routinely because it lacked 
enough information to always and easily generate the “big picture” and to fully describe 
stakeholders’ goals. 
5.3 Using resilience orchestration and resilience facilitation to support resilience planning  
In our study we saw that the MRPt sometimes orchestrated resilience planning by using the 
capabilities of its special position in the ports system, its integration perspective and its 
governmental powers. It did this by facilitating joined-up working between ports 
stakeholders. The key difference between resilience orchestration and resilience facilitation 
is that resilience orchestration includes resilience facilitation. Resilience facilitation is 
concerned with making it easier for ports system stakeholders to work together in resilience 
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planning activities by sharing information. In addition to this, resilience orchestration also 
includes the higher system-level aspects of resilience planning such as planning how to plan. 
For example, special winter resilience check lists were produced by the MRPt for ports based 
on learnings from some of the regional port workshops and from previous disruptions. We 
saw that collecting lower level experiences can enable the MRPt to form higher level 
learnings that can then be passed back down to support lower level stakeholders (Janssen & 
van der Voort, 2016). One role of an orchestrator is to increase the value creation capability 
of its system of stakeholders (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006). And a key tool to do this is the 
ability to influence stakeholders by selectively making them aware of different possibilities 
that they would value. A network orchestrator creates value by making stakeholders more 
aware of what is in their individual and mutual best interest, based on their known goals. 
Here, this included awareness of the efficiency benefits of resilience planning and new or 
external risks (Shaw et al., 2017).  
 
Figure 3: Revised conceptual framework. An orchestrator can build up a “big picture” 
by aggregation. Then alternative options and other information that are collected can 
be prioritised against this big picture. So the “big picture” also acts as a contextual 
filter. The orchestrator facilitates the work of other stakeholders by helping them with 
greater awareness of options and other information. This includes opportunities for 
more join-up working and selected options which fit the orchestrator’s governance 
goals.  
There are clear advantages to resilience panning activities that come from a better 
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Black blocks show the additional contributions of the 
Revised conceptual framework.
Block arrows show the order and the arrangement of the 
Revised framework’s conceptual flow.
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hierarchies of alternative capabilities. But alternatives have to be assembled from many 
information sources. This has implications for resilience planning in terms of motivating 
stakeholders to support resilience planning and activities after a crisis. Between them, ports-
related organisations have a huge amount of information from sensors and business IT 
systems, which can help to prepare for and sense crises. Also, resilience planning requires 
detailed knowledge of alternative routes, resources and other capabilities to call upon. But 
persuading organisations to share is difficult and then integrating that information into a “big 
picture” is even harder. The big picture must be detailed as well as system-wide. It must 
include information on alternative ports, routes, capacities, capabilities, staff, machinery and 
consumables. But it would enable the MRPt to make country-level resilience decisions and 
plans, to optimise its normal operations and to act quickly within a crisis. A big picture of 
ports stakeholders’ capabilities, information needs and operational goals would also help the 
MRPt to guide stakeholders in their goal choosing; and to motivate then by helping them to 
work more efficiently together using information sharing. This is consistent with the concept 
of adaptive governance because it uses lower level system capabilities to enable higher level 
learnings and advice. Which then flow back to lower level stakeholders as a way of dealing 
with a complex and uncertain environment (Janssen & van der Voort, 2016; Wang et al., 
2017). An integration perspective can generate a ‘big picture’, which can be used as an 
architectural mechanism for self-organised and adaptive coordination.  
In summary, Platforms produce complexity by aggregating information and the dependencies 
that it describes. But they can also provide a special context, perspective, “world view” or 
“big picture” which can filter information as well. Aggregation helped the MRPt to give ports 
stakeholders an awareness of more options. The “big picture” helped the MRPt to assess each 
option within a context. This enabled prioritization. And when the MRPt helped ports firms 
to prioritise it facilitated their join-up working. Also, selecting which options to make certain 
stakeholders aware of is a governance tool of network orchestration. Our insight is that 
platforms enable orchestration by enabling orchestrators to help stakeholders to join-up. At 
the same time platforms enable orchestrators to govern stakeholders by selecting between 
possibilities for joining-up. We have summarised this in Figure 3.  
6. Conclusions 
6.1 Contributions for researchers and managers 
Government and business orchestrators are single organisations which influence and integrate 
a network of other organisations. Orchestrators are challenged by the complexities of 
understanding the diverse capabilities and goals of the many different organisations which 
they orchestrate. Influencing them is also a challenge. The similarities between government 
and business orchestrators have enabled us to contribute in several ways. First, by focusing 
on a government department with limited resources we have added to the l-Government’s 
orchestration literature with the concept of integration perspective. We used this concept to 
explain how a single orchestrator was able to access the huge range of information sources 
from stakeholders in a whole market, whilst avoiding information overload. Digital platforms 
enabled the MRPt to build up a “big picture” of the ports system. A “big picture” which could 
then be used to filter information and to avoid information overload. Filtration was possible 
because it enabled aggregated knowledge to be assessed for priority within a wider context.  
Second, we developed the concepts of resilience orchestration and resilience facilitation. A 
“big picture” enables an orchestrator to aggregate, filter and prioritise. When the MRPt 
helped ports firms to prioritise it facilitated their join-up working by helping them to 
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collaborate on shared priorities. A significant governance tool for an orchestrator is the ability 
to choose which options to make stakeholders aware of. Resilience orchestration 
conceptualises how ports system stakeholders can be motivated to work together more 
smoothly so that they share their capabilities. This explained why they would cooperate as 
well as how cooperation was possible. The act of selectively passing on the awareness of 
certain options is an additional motivator to the ‘visible hand’ of law-making and the 
‘invisible hand’ of government incentives (Bharosa, 2013). The power of selectively showing 
options to others enabled us to better conceptualise the facilitation and the governance 
aspects of orchestration. Third, we have used this research to show how the MRPt could use 
flow paths of interlinked capabilities to plan resilient alternatives and how ports stakeholders 
could be motivated to share capabilities and information. Which might have been in return 
for support in improving their business efficiency or reaching their goals.  
6.2 Limitations and Further Research 
Our aim was to build theory but drawing insights from a single case has external 
generalisation implications (Lee, 1989). But a single case is appropriate at the start of theory 
generation (Benbasat et al, 1987) and it does not degrade analytic or theoretical generalisation 
(Robson, 2002). Our case did not cover international aspects of the global ports system and 
we chose a single orchestrator. It may be that other organisations orchestrate the same 
markets using other special capabilities (Janssen & Estevez, 2013). Other orchestrators may 
have different “world views”. Also, platforms enable orchestration by defragmenting 
systems. Different platforms link different aspects of their users and defragment different 
aspects of systems. These would constitute different forms of orchestration with different 
purposes and benefits for stakeholders. Also, platforms enable orchestration but orchestrators 
are themselves platforms for network members to use. This suggests a hierarchical ‘stack’ of 
platform functionality, which may integrate resources on multiple system levels. Further 
research is required to investigate the relationships between different orchestration “world 
views”, different “defragmentation platforms” and different levels of resource integration. 
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